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Executive Summary 
 
In a letter addressed to the joint Council of Europe/European Union project “Strengthening the 
Capacities of Law Enforcement and Judiciary in the Fight against Corruption in Serbia” (PACS), the 
Minister of Justice and Public Administration of Serbia has asked the Council of Europe for 
expert opinion on draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers. The draft law has been recently 
approved by the Working Group set by the Ministry.  
 
This opinion focuses on the compatibility of the draft law with Council of Europe standards 
and good practice of different European jurisdictions. 
 
In view of that the draft law was assessed against the only detailed international measure on 
this subject - draft Council of Europe Recommendation on Whistleblowing (hereinafter ‘the 
CoE Recommendation’). It shows the draft law achieves a high degree of convergence, 
although a few issues remain.  
 
The draft law is skilfully drafted but like all laws seeking to regulate such a complex field, it is 
open to improvement. Therefore experts team raised several issues in this paper in the 
expectation that this law may also become a template for other countries, so it is worth going 
the extra mile to get it as right as it can be. Nevertheless, it is known that ‘the best is the 
enemy of the good,’ that compromises may have to be made in the Parliamentary process, and 
that it may not be possible at present to adopt a law that addresses all of the issues.  The 
priority issues are identified in bold.  
 
The longest experience of a specific law on whistleblowing is to be found in the UK, (the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998). The operation of that law was recently reviewed by an 
independent commission and that report had been taken into account when comments in this 
paper were made (‘the 2013 Report’)1.  
 
Given that the opinion was prepared on English translation of the draft law, several of the 
comments below may relate to simple translation issues which can be easily resolved.   
  
                                                           
1
 Full title: Report on the effectiveness of existing arrangements for workplace whistleblowing in the 
UK, (November 2013), available on the PCAW website. 
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1. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.1 The Draft Law 
 
Article 2.1 
 
There are other laws in Serbia which contain provisions for disclosures to be made and which 
are not repealed by Article 382. It may be preferable to state ‘in accordance with this or any 
other relevant law’, or possibly ‘in accordance with the principles of this law’. 
 
Disclosures to ‘the public’ are allowed by Article 12, and ‘the public’ should be mentioned 
here. A clearer formulation might be: ‘to his employer, to an authorised authority or to the 
public’. 
 
It would be helpful to define the phrase ‘threat to or violation of the public interest’ by 
reference to Article 5. 
 
Article 2.2 
 
It is desirable to cover not only those who have made a disclosure but those who ‘are about to 
disclose.’ That might be discovered for example if they copy documents or state that they will 
notify unless the unlawful practice is changed. This clarification would prevent pre-emptive 
strikes and gagging orders.  
 
The term ‘good faith’ is not used in the CoE Recommendation. It caused difficulty in the UK 
and was removed from the law in 2013.  The problem was that the term, when left undefined, 
left the door open for argument about the whistleblower’s motives.  If it is retained, it would 
be good to make clear here that the term is used as defined in Article 6.  The possibility of 
removing it from the draft law is discussed under Article 6.  
 
Article 2.3 
 
The phrase "makes probable" is unclear. It is suggested that the burden of proof should be 
"can show on reasonable grounds". That fits in with the CoE Recommendation 
(Principle 22). The same point arises on Article 8.  
 
                                                           
2
 For example, the Law on Civil Servants, and the Law on Free Access to Information of Public 
Importance. 
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The law should cover a person who is falsely accused of being a whistleblower. Failure to 
cover their cases has proved a problem in the UK3.  This might be done by making clear here 
that ‘associated person’ includes persons with a ‘real or supposed’ connection with the 
whistleblower, as well as those wrongly supposed to be whistleblowers.  
 
Article 2.5 
 
There is no mention of part-time employment. It seems clear there is no intention to exclude it 
and it might be better to mention it (or else delete ‘full-time’), as the current wording risks 
creating an argument. 
 
There is no mention of contractors. It is assumed that they are in fact covered by the concept 
of ‘any factual work’, but it would be better to clarify the inclusion.   
 
In accordance with the CoE Recommendation (Principle 4) it would be necessary to cover 
former employees, and desirable to cover applicants for employment:  
- former employees because it is possible to retaliate effectively after a worker leaves 
the job, such as by cutting off pension benefits;  and  
- applicants to defend against blacklisting, which can be an even worse consequence 
than loss of the original job.  
 
Article 2.7 
 
It is desirable to mention not only ‘awareness’ of whistleblowing but the ‘perception’ that 
whistleblowing has taken place, to allow for cases of mistake.  
 
Article 2.8 
 
"Stipulated by law" may be too high a threshold, as victimisation can take many forms.  The 
definition is presumably intended to include financial losses but it might be better to state 
that clearly. 
 
Article 3 
 
It seems odd to place a provision on abuse at the beginning. It would be more usual to find 
such a provision placed at the end, and to be accompanied by a penalty. 
 
                                                           
3
 A recommendation to change UK law to cover these people was made in the 2013 Report (93-95).  
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Article 5 
 
The CoE Recommendation (Principle 2) requires clarity as to scope and suggests the 
framework “should, at least, include violations of law and human rights, as well as risks to 
public health and safety and to the environment”.  ‘Three years’ qualification seems to be too 
restrictive. Most laws cover not only all criminal offences, but breaches of civil rights also. The 
requirement that risks be 'immediate' also appears too restrictive: 'substantial and specific' is 
used rather than 'immediate' in UN and World Bank policies. An alternative example of a clear 
statement of scope is found in the Irish Bill currently before their Parliament4.  
 
The time limits could be an issue where criminal offences are concerned. It would be odd to 
leave someone unprotected for blowing the whistle on a crime before its statute of limitations 
had expired. That would discourage testimony that could still affect the outcome of pending 
cases. It would be better to specify that where criminal offences are concerned, the normal 
rules on statutes of limitation apply to whistleblowing. The limits specified here would apply 
only to wrongdoing that was not criminal. 
 
The final reference to ‘paragraph 1’ here (and in Articles 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11) is confusing. It is 
assumed that such references are intended to cover the whole first paragraph of Article 5, 
including the types of act mentioned in both 1 and 2. If so, the numbering of paragraphs might 
usefully be clearer. If not, there is an extremely significant loophole.  It would mean that 
job duties only are protected when serious crimes are involved. That would be far 
narrower than best practices, because often there is no illegality, but misconduct 
seriously threatens the public interest from abuse of authority, or breakdowns in 
achieving missions to protect the public or environment.  
 
Article 6 
 
The CoE Recommendation (Principle 22) makes it clear that so long as the whistleblower can 
show there are reasonable grounds to suspect a threat or harm to the public interest, he or 
she should be protected even if mistaken. It does not mention ‘good faith’ and it may be 
preferable not to use this unclear term.  Instead, the term ‘good faith’ in Article 2.2, Article 6, 
and Article 19 might be replaced with ‘on reasonable grounds.’ Irrespective of the decision on 
‘good faith’ it would be neater to move points 1 and 2 in Article 6 to Article 3, as other 
instances of abuse of whistleblowing.   
 
                                                           
4
 Clause 5 (3) of the Protected Disclosures Bill. 
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In English the phrase 'would agree' implies that no-one could disagree, or unanimity. 'Could 
agree' is preferable as it means the belief is reasonable, but there is room for fair 
disagreement. A requirement for universal agreement would disqualify virtually everyone, 
since there always are two sides when there is a dispute over exercise of power. It is 
important that the language does not leave any room for confusion.   
 
The whistleblower may have received some legal benefits under point 1: for example if 
he/she had some legal costs paid or if he/she accepted a gagging clause in a settlement and 
then changed his/her mind.  Therefore the benefits referred to in 1 should be limited to 
‘illegal’ benefits, as in point 2.  
 
Article 7 
 
In line with the comment on Article 2.3, it would be useful to clarify here that the association 
with the whistleblower may be actual or supposed (mistaken).  
 
Article 9 
 
Article 9 covers some intending whistleblowers, but there may be others. For example, 
sometimes it will be necessary for a whistleblower to discuss his/her impending disclosure 
with other employees to verify the accuracy of information as required by Article 6. But the 
other employee may reveal the whistleblower’s identity leading to retaliation before the 
whistleblower makes a disclosure to any company official.  This article should cover that 
situation by referring also to seeking information from employees for Article 6 purposes.  
 
Article 10 
 
It would be desirable to start from the presumption that the whistleblower’s personal data 
will be protected, unless he/she requests otherwise. Also, it should be clarified that ‘personal 
data’ includes any information that could be used to identify the whistleblower. Identifying 
information might include certain facts which represent the whistleblower’s “signature“ due 
to unique knowledge or some other factor that permits tracing them back to the 
whistleblower. 
 
In the third paragraph, it would be preferable to say ‘before receiving’ rather than ‘while 
receiving’.  The warning would need to be made before the disclosure was (officially) received 
if at all practicable. 
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Article 12 
 
The definition of the term ‘employer’ in Article 2 looks rather limited for the purposes of 
Article 12 (though it is clearly appropriate for other articles such as 15).  In practice the 
majority of whistleblowing disclosures that lead to retaliation start with an employee’s 
disclosure to a supervisor.  Disclosures might also be made to the organisational head, the 
Board of Directors, or associated organisations such as the relevant trade union. The simplest 
solution might be to add here (and in Article 14) ‘or any person authorised by the employer 
under Article 15 to receive disclosures’.   The Government Act under Article 14 might then 
clarify what kind of people employers should authorise. Supervisors (line managers) would 
obviously need to be among them. Trade Unions could be another possible channel, and in the 
UK the proposal is to ensure this by statute5.    
 
Article 13 
 
This seems to place too many burdens on the whistleblower at the point of disclosure. The 
whistleblower may not know what law has been violated – and moreover Article 5 covers 
some cases where no law is violated.  All that should be required of the whistleblower is 
reasonable belief that he/she has information showing a threat to the public interest (as 
defined in Article 5). Almost no one presents all the evidence when initially exposing a 
problem or challenging misconduct. In fact, if the disclosure is to a potential wrongdoer it 
could be obstruction of justice to expose all the evidence before law enforcement authorities 
see it. What is important is that the whistleblower can demonstrate his reasonable concerns, 
not that he can present all the evidence at the outset. 
 
The last paragraph seems to apply to all anonymous disclosures, regardless of their 
importance. Presumably the intention is that it is limited to Article 5 cases and it would be 
clearer to say so.  
 
Article 14 
 
The fifth paragraph refers to Article 4, but presumably means paragraph 4 of Article 14.  It 
seems simpler to combine these two paragraphs. 
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 The proposal in the 2013 Report is that access for whistleblowers to unions should be totally open, as 
access to lawyers is now. 
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In the final paragraph, the word ‘closely’ seems unnecessary and inappropriate. The 
Government Act should be subject to consultation with employers and should leave space for 
employers to think through what is appropriate for their organisation and ‘own’ the result.  (It 
is noted that under the model, recently proposed for the UK, the Government would produce a 
broad Code of Practice for employers.6  There would be no requirement for employers to 
follow the Code but it would be taken into account – by regulators and the courts - when 
whistleblowing cases arise).  
 
Article 15 
 
In the second paragraph, ‘visible place’ seems to imply a notice board but it might be helpful 
to make clear that publication on a website is not sufficient. This might be done by adding ‘in 
addition to electronic communication, where available’.  
 
In the third paragraph, should the reference be to paragraph 3 of Article 14? If not, would it 
not be simpler to combine the second and third paragraphs? More than one person needs to 
be authorised to receive disclosures in any employer with over 10 employees.   
 
The experts’ team do not recommend that access to the case file (as required in the final 
paragraph) can always be granted – for example the case may be with the prosecutor. Access 
should be subject to the rights to privacy and to a fair trial.  (The same point arises on 
Article 17). 
 
Article 17 
 
It is suggested to add to the second paragraph the following: ‘The competent authority shall 
be bound by commitments made by the initial authorised authority to the whistleblower to 
comply with confidentiality protection under Article 10’.  
 
Article 18 
 
In the first paragraph, it is presumed that conditions 1 and 2 are alternatives, not cumulative 
requirements. This should be clarified (e.g. by inserting the word ’or’ between 1 and 2.)  
 
The ‘reasonable time limit’ in 1 might be clarified by adding the phrase ‘to make a difference 
in tackling the alleged misconduct.’ 
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 A draft code was drawn up in the 2013 Report, see 51-55. 
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It is not clear why it is specified (under 2) that the official procedure must be finalised. Is it 
not enough that the procedure should be irregular?  
 
In the light of the ECHR case law7, there are other circumstances where whistleblowing to the 
public would be permitted under Article 10, even if there was no previous authorised 
authority disclosure. It would be desirable to add (possibly as new conditions 3 and 4):  
 
- the whistleblower reasonably believes that otherwise there is risk that evidence may 
be destroyed; or 
- the whistleblower reasonably believes that other alternative avenues for disclosure 
would lead to retaliation.  
 
The question is also the penultimate paragraph necessary? Is it not already covered by the law 
on journalists’ secrets? If that says something different – e.g. about the categories of journalist 
covered, there could be a problem. 
 
In the final paragraph, it seems preferable to specify that the whistleblower has to comply 
with the laws protecting the right to privacy (etc). Otherwise, the restriction could be open-
ended and subjective. There should be objective boundaries for restrictions, so that 
whistleblowers do not have to guess.  
 
Should the same duty not fall on authorised authorities? The personal data of someone 
accused by a whistleblower should enjoy some form of protection at least until a formal trial 
is opened or guilt has been proved.  
 
Article 19 
 
The second paragraph should refer to data ‘specifically marked or designated as’ classified. 
This was the subject of a key amendment to US law, because data was not marked and then 
was classified after the fact in order to attack the whistleblower. While there may be classified 
but unmarked data generally, for whistleblower rights there must be clear notice of its 
restricted status. Unless this is already clear in the law on classified data, that should be 
clarified for this purpose.  
 
This paragraph contains a very broad definition of classified data: for example, there seems a 
risk that data referring to the relations of Serbia with international organisations or entities 
                                                           
7
 Especially Guja v Moldova, case no. 14277/04, 12 February 2008. 
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might include anything on mismanagement of EU money. Article 10 of the previous draft law 
(version from April 2013), appears to be tighter in its definition of classified information, by 
referring to information with the highest degree of confidentiality.  The previous draft Article 
10 also stated that classified data (though not that classified to the highest degree) could be 
released if more serious damage could thus be avoided.  
 
Article 20 
 
It seems too specific to say that a disclosure must be made to ‘the immediate supervisor’. 
What happens if the supervisor is suspected of involvement? It seems preferable to say ‘a 
supervisor’. 
 
Article 21 
 
The two additional circumstances proposed for Article 18 should apply here too, namely – 
 
- the whistleblower reasonably believes that otherwise there is a risk that evidence may 
be destroyed, or 
- the whistleblower reasonably believes that the use of  alternative avenues for 
disclosure would lead to retaliation.  
 
Article 22 
 
This should cover not only actions that the employer takes, but also those that he fails to take, 
that put the whistleblower at a disadvantage. It should also be clear that the employer must 
not cause or permit any damaging consequence. 
 
Under point 7 on the list, there should be added, ‘including removal of duties, reassignment, 
or harassment by co-workers’. It is also suggested to add two new points to the list:  
 
9. Benefits, including pension or insurance compensation. 
10. Psychiatric evaluation or mandatory medical procedure. 
 
It is not clear what the final paragraph means or why it is needed.  
 
Article 24 
 
The reliance on court protection could be open to criticism, as the surveys show that civil 
courts in Serbia do not enjoy public trust when it comes to their effectiveness. There is a case 
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for ensuring whistleblower cases are heard by specialized judges, perhaps operating as a 
specialized section of the civil court.  This would presumably require special funding.     
 
‘90 days’ is too short given the usual internal trajectory preceding taking cases to court. One 
year is normal, and some laws have six year limits. 180 days is the minimum for credible laws. 
This is particularly true for such a new right, where employees may not be aware of it, and it 
is harder to find a lawyer.  
 
Article 25  
 
The article does not state against whom the lawsuit can be directed. Article 28 (on the burden 
of proof) implies that it must be the employer.  The disclosure of serious wrongdoing at a 
small employer may result in the employer falling into insolvency. What is the remedy in such 
cases? Possibly there should be a right to compensation from a public fund at least in such 
cases where the whistleblower provided public benefits and fails to get other compensation. 
 
The last paragraph is not clear, but it seems to undermine Article 25 point 2 and 3, and if so 
that would be a serious flaw, and would appear to conflict with the CoE Recommendation 
(Principle 11). The Commissioner for Information has also analysed this provision and 
criticised the inability of the law to protect whistleblowers to have acts on dismissal, 
suspension, downgrading, salary decrease, etc.  
 
Article 26 
 
It is understood that there are concerns in Serbia that this provision seeks to place on the 
Information Commissioner, the various Ombudsmen, and the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), 
duties that may not be within their remits or sphere of expertise.  This may be less true of the 
Anti-Corruption Agency, which has a relevant role to assist civil service whistleblowers under 
Article 56 of the Anti-Corruption Act.  The present draft law could amend their remits, but 
their agreement would be needed. That is a serious issue that requires discussion with the 
authorities.  
 
Article 28 
 
Although in line with the CoE Recommendation (Principle 25), the requirement to show that 
the damaging consequence was ‘due to’ whistleblowing makes this a less powerful reversal of 
the burden of proof than exists in some other laws. 'Due to' implies that retaliation for 
whistleblowing must be the primary cause for an action, before the burden of proof shifts.  It 
would be preferable to provide that if the whistleblower proves illegal retaliation is any factor 
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in the decision, the burden of proof should shift. This is the cornerstone for the U.N., World 
Bank and U.S. whistleblower standards/laws. Other laws require only whistleblowing and 
subsequent detriment, so that the link is assumed. Possibly, the provisions of the Article 18 of 
the draft law from April 2013, could be a model for redefining this Article. 
 
The phrase ‘due to’ also occurs in Article 9 and it is suggested that it should be changed in line 
with this suggestion. 
 
Article 29 
 
It is suggested to add at the end: ‘If there has been an investigation by the Ombudsman, Anti-
Corruption Agency or other authority under Article 26, the court may rely on that authority’s 
fact-finding.’ 
 
Article 32 
 
Subject to discussion with the authorities concerned, a new final paragraph is suggested as 
follows: ‘An authority listed in Article 26 may file a request for temporary relief on behalf of a 
whistleblower. The request shall be addressed as a priority with deference to the authority’s 
findings. The request shall be approved, unless formally denied within eight days.’ 
 
Temporary relief may be the most significant portion of the law in terms of making a 
difference against retaliation. Employers count on delays that whistleblowers cannot survive. 
When there is temporary relief, the employer normally settles on terms the whistleblower can 
accept. This additional paragraph is highly desirable for two reasons: 1) The listed agencies 
will have unique authority, particularly at the beginning, to understand the new rights, and 
unlike the parties will be acting on behalf of the government. As a result, their expertise and 
objective good government mission should receive deferential burdens of proof. 2) The 
problem of excessive backlogs remains a reality, and priority treatment is an unenforceable 
goal. There needs to be a structure locking in timely action. Passive approval, unless there is a 
formal rejection, will force courts to screen the cases for those they want to reject, while 
preventing backlogs from depriving a whistleblower of timely justice.  
 
Article 35 
 
The same issue applies as in Article 26. 
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Article 36 
 
It is not clear why different penalties apply in the second and third paragraphs. The second 
paragraph appears to apply to all public bodies. The fourth only applies to entrepreneurs.   In 
Article 2.4 an entrepreneur is included in the definition of employer. If an entrepreneur is 
simply one type of employer, why does Article 36 treat him differently? 
 
The last paragraph is not clear. No misdemeanour of revealing identity is mentioned in 
Article 36. Why should any such misdemeanour be limited to persons mentioned in the 
second para?   
 
It would seem simpler and fairer to apply the same penalties to all.   
 
Article 38 
 
Provisions about the repeal of Article 56 of the Anti-Corruption Act are doubtful. The third 
paragraph of that allows the Anti-Corruption Agency to extend to civil service whistleblowers 
any necessary assistance, in accordance with law.  That seems useful in relation to the role 
proposed for the Anti-Corruption Agency under Article 26.  It might be preferable to amend 
and update Article 56 rather than repeal it. It is noted that the 2011 Rulebook for 
whistleblowers would need to be reconsidered in the light of this law.  
1.2 Missing provisions 
 
No agreement with employer can prevent disclosures 
 
The CoE Recommendation (Principle 11) seeks to ensure that any obligations to an employer 
which would prevent the disclosure of a public interest issue should be void. This proved a 
problem in the UK, where settlements between whistleblowers and employers often included 
‘gagging’ clauses even though these are void under existing law8.  It would be useful to include 
a new article, on the lines of the new simple provision proposed for the UK: ‘No agreement 
made before, during or after employment, between a worker and an employer may preclude a 
worker from whistleblowing.’  
 
 
 
                                                           
8
 See the 2013 Report, paras 105-109.   
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1.3 Review 
 
It would be desirable to have a provision for review (as the current Irish Bill does9), to meet 
the CoE Recommendation (principle 29). 
 
This could possibly be a role for the Ombudsman (subject to agreement with him).  
For example: 
1) requirement for Ombudsman to collect data on number, type, and actions taken by 
'authorised authorities' through whistleblowing to them, and to report this to Parliament; 
2) state that the Act and its by-laws are to be reviewed by the Ombudsman every few  years, 
with recommendations for improving the Act. 
1.4 Offence of retaliation 
 
The draft law from April 2013 had a criminal offence of retaliation (its Article 34). This would 
be a helpful supplement to the possibility of civil action.  
1.5 Professional privilege and legal advice 
 
The CoE Recommendation states: ‘These principles are without prejudice to the well-
established and recognised rules for the protection of legal and other professional privilege’ 
(Principle 6). The experts team is not aware if it has been decided that this point does not 
require a provision in Serbia but it is noted that it did require a small provision in the UK. That 
provision ensures that a lawyer who is approached for legal advice by a whistleblower is not 
protected as a whistleblower if he/she decides himself to pass that information on10.  His/her 
professional duty is to maintain confidentiality, unless his/her client instructs him/her to 
make a disclosure on his behalf, or if exceptionally he/she is required to make a report by law, 
e.g. on money laundering. 
 
If such a provision is made it would be useful for it also to make clear that a whistleblower has 
an unfettered right to seek legal advice, in confidence, before making any disclosure. This is 
relevant to the CoE Recommendation (Principle 28). 
                                                           
9
 Clause 2 of the Protected Disclosures Bill 2013, which provides:  
‘The Minister shall— 
(a) not later than the end of the period of 5 years beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, 
commence a review of the operation of this Act, and 
(b) not more than 12 months after the end of that period, make a report to each House of the 
[Parliament] of the findings made on the review and of the conclusions drawn from the findings. 
10
 43B(4) in PIDA. 
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1.6 Implementing the Law 
 
The Law might usefully be supplemented by informal guidance on which are the 'authorised 
authorities'.  There have been problems with exclusive lists, and also it proved impractical in 
the UK to maintain up to date a list in a regulation made under the Act.  However, a non-
exclusive list in guidance would be helpful to whistleblowers and to others: Article 17 
stipulates that if the whistleblower is mistaken, the recipient has to pass it on to the 
appropriate authority. Article 10 also suggests the desirability of a list of 'authorised 
authorities'. 
 
It seems a lot to ask a whistleblower to verify the ‘completeness’ of data (Article 6). However, 
to be responsible, whistleblower should have to do their homework before making 
accusations. But the background guidance should make clear that the whistleblower may 
already have the verification needed, due to being an eyewitness or due to technical expertise. 
A new homework assignment is not always necessary. 
 
Guidance should also clarify that it is still lawful and protected to make an unclassified 
summary of the misconduct, even if secret data is involved. Classified data simply cannot be 
disclosed publicly.  
 
The implementation process should also address some points in the CoE Recommendation: 
 
- consultation with workers and their representatives on proposals to set up internal 
reporting procedures, (Principle 16);  
- wide promotion of the framework (Principle 27).  
1.7 Comments on the Explanatory Memorandum 
 
1. It would be helpful to explain why the draft covers all types of wrongdoing, when the 
mentioned Conventions cover only corruption. It might be worth adding to section II, for 
example:  
‘the decision to cover all types of wrongdoing is in line with the Council of Europe 
Recommendation and with international good practice.  Corruption is not uniquely evil, nor is 
it the only type of offence that is difficult to detect without whistleblowers’. 
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2. The decision not to introduce a rewards scheme is not seen as an issue. The same 
conclusion was recently reached in the light of public consultation in the UK11. The reasons 
given included the risk of encouraging negative views about whistleblowers and undermining 
the credibility of witnesses in court proceedings that might arise. However, the dismissal of 
the idea in the EM seems rather over-assertive. There is a case for rewards, based on the fact 
that whistleblowers often undergo a great deal of stress, and compensation only restores 
them to where they would have been if they had not blown the whistle. As the draft from April 
2013 did propose rewards, and some people remain in favour of them, it would be better to 
state something like: 
 
‘We considered introducing a system of rewards but decided against this for several reasons. 
In our view…….’ 
 
3. The final paragraph states that no additional funds will be required to implement the law.  
This is open to question, especially in view of the additional court cases that can be expected, 
and the new duties proposed in Articles 26 and 35. Resolution of the issue mentioned under 
Article 24 would also be likely to require funding.  Possibly it would be better to admit there 
are costs, but that the benefits outweigh the costs. Figures from South Korea show that in 
2012, about $10m was recovered in 40 cases raised by whistleblowers (and about $1 m was 
given to the whistleblowers in rewards). 
 
4. A final version of the document in which the provisions of the Council of Europe 
Recommendation are mapped against the draft law might helpfully form part of the EM.  
 
2. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion it can be said that this is already a draft law that has the potential to be very 
helpful to whistleblowers in Serbia. If the priority issues identified above are addressed it 
would represent an advanced law.  There are however two major issues that possibly need to 
be further discussed – firstly, the controversy about the proposed role of some authorities in 
Article 26 and secondly the reliance on remedies from civil courts.  
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 2013 Report, 56-63. 
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3. APPENDIX I – Assessment of Conformity with Council of Europe Standards 
 
Mapping of the Serbian Draft Law against the Council of Europe Recommendation on Whistleblower Protection (Provisional Principles) 
Colour legend: green - full convergence; yellow - room for improvement; red - contradictory or missing 
CoE 
Principle 
Short description Evaluation Recommendations for enhancement  
Material scope 
1 
National framework should establish 
rules to protect rights and interest of 
whistleblowers 
 The draft law should be a valuable basis for the other elements of 
such a national framework, provided it intermeshes effectively 
with the workings of the Ombudsperson, the Information 
Commissioner and the courts.  
2 
Scope of ‘public interest’  Art 5 outlines this, but in a way that seems too narrow and unclear 
in its application. Most laws cover not only all criminal offences, 
but breaches of civil rights also. The requirement that risks be 
'immediate' also appears too restrictive. 
Personal scope 
3 
Wide understanding of working 
relationships 
 Covered by Art 2.2 and 2.5. The draft law covers both public and 
private sector. Some minor clarifications are proposed. 
4 
Covers individuals whose work-based 
relationship has ended, or those during 
a pre-contractual negotiation stage 
 In Art 2.5: Add ‘former employees’ and also, if possible, 
‘applicants’. 
5 
Special scheme or rules applying to 
information relating to national security 
 There is a risk of incoherence and ad-hoc decisions by authorities 
because the notion of ‘classified information’ is too broad in Art 19. 
It is suggested to refer to ‘data specifically marked or designated as 
classified’ and to reconsider some of the ideas from the previous 
draft: notably the restriction to ‘highest classified’. 
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6 
Without prejudice to rules for the 
protection of legal and other 
professional privilege 
 The draft law currently does not include such stipulation. 
Consideration needs to be given as to whether this principle can be 
met without any provision.   
Normative framework 
7 
Comprehensive and coherent approach 
to facilitating whistleblowing 
 The approach in the draft law gains its comprehensiveness and 
coherence especially through Art 12, 15-18, 22-24, 31-34, and 35. 
There are risks of incoherence if comments in bold (in particular 
on Art 5, 6, 13, 24, 25, 26, and 35) are not addressed. 
There are risks of incomprehensiveness if comments in bold (in 
particular on Art 2.5, 9, 19, 28, and 32) are not addressed. 
8 
Restrictions and exceptions should be 
no more than necessary 
 Restrictions are limited but see comments on principles 2 and 5, 
covered in respectively Art 5 and 19. 
9 
Ensure effective mechanisms for acting 
on public interest disclosures 
 The draft law includes such stipulations in Art 14, 15, 17, 18, and 
21. 
10 
Protection and remedies under rules of 
general law for those prejudiced by 
whistleblowing are retained 
 The draft law does not remove existing protections and makes 
specific new provisions  in Art 3, 6, and 18 (final paragraph). 
11 
Employers cannot call on legal or 
contractual obligations to prevent or 
penalise someone from making a public 
interest disclosure 
 It is desirable to add a provision to make this clear. 
Channels for reporting and disclosures 
12 
Foster an environment that encourages 
disclosure in an open matter 
 The overall effect of the law should be to encourage open 
reporting.  Art 13 does require authorities to act on anonymous 
disclosures, but this is not unreasonable. However, Art 13 places 
too many burdens on the whistleblower at the point of disclosure 
and this might have a chilling effect.  
13 
Clear channels are in place  Clarity can be enhanced through a list of prescribed authorities 
and their competence to receive disclosures, though this might 
best be done in guidance rather than in the law. 
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14 Three tiers for whistleblowing  Covered by Art 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18. 
15 
Encouragement for employers to put in 
place internal procedures 
 Art 14 requires employers to make internal acts and refers to a 
Government Act that will further regulate this. 
16 
Workers to be consulted on internal 
procedures 
 Not covered in this law, but should be in the Act announced in Art 
14. 
17 
Internal whistleblowing or to regulatory 
bodies to be encouraged as general rule 
 Covered by Art 12, 16, 17, and 35. 
Confidentiality 
18 
Whistleblowers entitled to 
confidentiality  
 Covered by Art 10. 
Acting on reporting and disclosure 
19 Prompt investigation  Covered by Art 15 and 17. 
20 
Whistleblower should be informed of 
action taken 
 Covered by Art 15 and 17. 
Protection against retaliation 
21 Protection against retaliation of any 
form 
 Art 22 does not cover protection from retaliation by co-workers. 
In Art 24, time limits are too short to be effective.  
There appears to be a contradiction in Art 25 last para: this 
whistleblower protection should be able to revoke the legality of 
certain actions – that is one of the crucial things the law must do. 
As it reads now, Art 25 (last par) suggests that this law cannot 
revoke any action that is legal under another law (e.g. right to 
dismiss). 
22 Protection not to be lost on mistaken 
disclosures only 
 Art 6 covers this. 
 
23 Entitlement to raise the fact that 
disclosure was made in accordance with 
national framework 
 Covered by Art 24. 
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24 Passing-by internal procedure may be 
taken into consideration when deciding 
on remedies 
 Not specifically covered, but no barrier to court considering the 
issue.  Also, restrictions on going public in Art 18 are relevant.  
25 Burden of proof in detriment 
considerations is on employer 
 The reversal of the burden of proof in Art 28 is probably in line 
with this principle. However the wording ‘due to’ implies 
retaliation for whistleblowing must be the primary cause for an 
action before the burden of proof shifts. This amounts to requiring 
the whistleblower to win before the burden shifts. A better balance 
would be found if the requirement for the whistleblower is to show 
that blowing the whistle was one of the factors leading to the 
damaging actions. 
26 Interim relief should be available  Art 31 is in line but it is desirable that it be enhanced because of 
the importance of such provisions for the effective working of 
whistleblower legislation. 
Advice, awareness and assessment 
27 National framework should be 
promoted widely 
 Out of scope of legislation. The law has been subject to wide 
consultation but its implementation should still be promoted 
widely when it happens. Its operation to be discussed as part of 
provisions for principle 29. 
28 Confidential advice should be available 
(preferably free of charge) 
 Covered by Art 35. Legal advice should also available to 
whistleblowers without any conditions, not even ‘good faith’. It 
would be useful to make that clear.    
29 Periodic assessments of the 
effectiveness of the national framework 
 The draft law does not include stipulations on this. 
Include Art that sets out a review process, possibly coordinated by 
the Ombudsperson in a report to Parliament. 
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4. APPENDIX II - Provisional Council of Europe Principles to Draft 
Recommendation on Whistleblower Protection12. 
 
Excerpt from: Appendix II to the Draft Meeting Report of 88th Meeting of the European 
Committee on Judicial Cooperation, December 16-18, 2013 , CDCJ (2013) 31 prov. (Strasbourg, 
19 December 2013) 
 
PRINCIPLES 
 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this recommendation and its principles: 
 
a. “Whistleblower” means any person who reports or discloses information on a threat 
or harm to the public interest in the context of their work-based relationship, 
whether public or private. 
 
b. “Public interest report or disclosure” means reporting or disclosing of information on 
acts and omissions that represent a threat or harm to the public interest. 
 
c. “Report” means reporting, either internally within an organisation or enterprise, or 
to an outside authority. 
 
d. “Disclosure” means making information public. 
 
I. Material scope 
 
1. The national normative, institutional and judicial framework, including, as appropriate, 
collective labour agreements, should be designed and developed to facilitate public interest 
reports and disclosures by establishing rules to protect the rights and interests of 
whistleblowers. 
 
2. Whilst it is for member States to determine what lies in the public interest for the 
purposes of implementing these principles, member States should clearly specify the scope of 
the national framework, which should, at least, include violations of law and human rights, as 
well as risks to public health and safety and to the environment. 
 
II. Personal scope 
 
3. The personal scope of the national framework should cover all individuals working in 
either the public or private sectors, irrespective of the nature of their working relationship and 
whether they are paid or not. 
                                                           
12
 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/whistleblowers/Whistleblowers%20meeting%20-
%20Explanatory%20notes%20.pdf 
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4. The national framework should also include individuals whose work-based relationship 
has ended and, possibly, where it is yet to begin in cases where information concerning a threat 
or harm to the public interest has been acquired during the recruitment process or other pre-
contractual negotiation stage. 
 
5. A special scheme or rules, including modified rights and obligations, may apply to 
information relating to national security, defence, intelligence, public order, or international 
relations of the state. 
 
6. These principles are without prejudice to the well-established and recognised rules for 
the protection of legal and other professional privilege. 
 
III. Normative framework 
 
7. The normative framework should reflect a comprehensive and coherent approach to 
facilitating public interest reporting and disclosures. 
 
8. Restrictions and exceptions to the rights and obligations of any person in relation to 
public interest reports and disclosures should be no more than necessary and, in any event, not 
be such as to defeat the objectives of the principles set out in this recommendation. 
 
9. Member states should ensure that there is in place an effective mechanism or 
mechanisms for acting on public interest reports and disclosures. 
 
10. Any person who is prejudiced, whether directly or indirectly, by the reporting or 
disclosure of inaccurate or misleading information should retain the protection and the 
remedies available to him or her under the rules of general law.  
 
11. An employer should not be able to rely on a person’s legal or contractual obligations in 
order to prevent that person from making a public interest report or disclosure or to penalise 
him or her for having done so. 
 
IV. Channels for reporting and disclosures  
 
12. The national framework should foster an environment that encourages reporting or 
disclosure in an open manner. Individuals should feel safe to freely raise public interest 
concerns.  
 
13. Clear channels should be put in place for public interest reporting and disclosures and 
recourse to them should be facilitated through appropriate measures. 
 
14. The channels for reporting and disclosures comprise:  
 
- Reports within an organisation or enterprise (including to persons designated to 
receive reports in confidence), 
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- Reports to relevant public regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies and 
supervisory bodies, 
 
- Disclosures to the public, for example to a journalist or a member of parliament.  
 
The individual circumstances of each case will determine the most appropriate channel. 
 
15. Encouragement should be given to employers to put in place internal reporting 
procedures.  
 
16. Workers and their representatives should be consulted on proposals to set-up internal 
reporting procedures, if appropriate. 
 
17. As a general rule, internal reporting and reporting to relevant public regulatory bodies, 
law enforcement agencies and supervisory bodies should be encouraged. 
 
V. Confidentiality  
 
18. Whistleblowers should be entitled to have the confidentiality of their identity 
maintained, subject to fair trial guarantees.  
 
VI. Acting on reporting and disclosure  
 
19. Public interest reports and disclosures by whistleblowers should be investigated 
promptly and, where necessary, the results acted on by the employer and the appropriate public 
regulatory body, law enforcement agency or supervisory body in an efficient and effective 
manner.  
 
20. A whistleblower who makes an internal report should, as a general rule, be informed, by 
the person to whom the report was made, of the action taken in response to the report. 
 
VII. Protection against retaliation  
 
21. Whistleblowers should be protected against retaliation of any form, whether directly or 
indirectly, by their employer and by persons working for or acting on behalf of the employer. 
Forms of such retaliation might include dismissal, suspension, demotion, loss of promotion 
opportunities, punitive transfers and reductions in or deductions of wages, harassment or other 
punitive or discriminatory treatment.  
 
22. Protection should not be lost on the basis only that the individual making the report or 
disclosure was mistaken as to its import or that the perceived threat to the public interest has 
not materialised, provided he or she had reasonable grounds to believe in its accuracy. 
 
23. A whistleblower should be entitled to raise, in appropriate civil, criminal or 
administrative proceedings, the fact that the report or disclosure was made in accordance with 
the national framework. 
 
CDCJ(2013)31 prov. 
25 
24. Where an employer has put in place an internal reporting system, and the whistleblower 
has made a disclosure to the public without resorting to the system, this may be taken into 
consideration when deciding on the remedies or level of protection to afford to the 
whistleblower. 
 
25. In legal proceedings relating to a detriment suffered by a whistleblower, and subject to 
him or her providing reasonable grounds to believe that the detriment was in retaliation for 
having made the report or disclosure, it should be for the employer to establish that the 
detriment was not so motivated. 
 
26. Interim relief pending the outcome of civil proceedings should be available for persons 
who have been the victim of retaliation for having made a public interest report or disclosure, 
particularly in cases of loss of employment. 
 
VIII. Advice, awareness and assessment  
 
27. The national framework should be promoted widely in order to develop positive 
attitudes amongst the public and professions and facilitate the disclosure of information in 
cases where the public interest is at stake. 
 
28. Consideration should be given to making access to information and confidential advice 
free of charge for individuals contemplating making a public interest report or disclosure. 
Existing structures able to provide such information and advice should be identified and their 
details made available to the general public. If necessary, and where possible, other appropriate 
structures might be equipped in order to fulfil this role or new structures created.  
 
29. Periodic assessments of the effectiveness of the national framework should be 
undertaken by the national authorities. 
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5. APPENDIX III – Draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers 
Chapter I  
Introductory Provisions 
Article 1 
Scope of the Law 
This Law regulates whistleblowing, whistleblowing procedure, rights of whistleblowers, 
obligations of the state authorities and other authorities and organizations in relation to 
whistleblowing, as well as other issues of importance for whistleblowing and protection of 
whistleblowers. 
Article 2 
Definitions  
In terms of this Law, terms shall have the following meaning: 
1. “whistleblowing” is disclosure of information made by a whistleblower  in accordance 
with this Law to the state or another authority or organization about a threat to or 
violation of public interest;  
2. “a whistleblower” is a natural person who, in terms of his working relationship; 
employment procedure; use of services rendered by public authorities, holders of public 
authorities or public services; business cooperation; ownership of shares in the 
company; discloses, in good faith, information about a threat to or violation of public 
interest in accordance with the Law; 
3. “an associated person” is a person who makes probable that a damaging action has 
been undertaken against him, due to his connection with a whistleblower;  
4. “an employer” is an authority of the Republic of Serbia, territorial province or local self-
government unit, holder of public authorities or a public service, or legal entity or 
entrepreneur which employs one or more persons; 
5. “working relationship” is full-time employment, work outside employment, 
volunteering, internship, or any other factual work for an employer;  
6. “an authorized authority” is any republic, provincial, or local government authority or 
holder of public authorities competent to act upon the information disclosed in 
accordance with the Law. 
7. “damaging action” is any action or omission, in particular a threat, by an employer or 
person in a working relationship with employer, that results from the awareness of 
whistleblowing.  
8. “damaging consequence” is any violation of rights, harassment, or discrimination 
stipulated by the law, which is caused by a damaging action.  
Chapter II  
General Provisions on Whistleblowing and Right to Protection 
Article 3 
Prohibition against Abuse of Whistleblowing 
Abuse of whistleblowing is prohibited.  
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A person that discloses the information he knew was untrue, with intent to receive 
benefit for himself or another person, or with intent to cause damage to another person, abuses 
whistleblowing.  
Article 4 
Prohibition of Undertaking Damaging Action 
Undertaking of any damaging action in terms of this Law shall be prohibited. 
Article 5  
Right to Protection of Whistleblower  
A whistleblower shall have the right to protection in accordance with this Law, if he 
discloses information in good faith related to: 
1. an action with the characteristic of a criminal offence punishable by prison sentence 
up to three years or a more severe penalty,  that violates or causes a threat to the public 
interest; 
2. an act causing an immediate threat to the life, health, or safety of people, the survival 
of plant or animal life, the environment, violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, or 
serious damage not prohibited by law or any other regulation. 
A whistleblower shall have the right to protection if the disclosure referred to in 
paragraph 1 herein is made within one year from the day he learned about the committed 
action and no later than 10 years from the commission of such action. 
Article 6 
Acting in Good Faith 
A person shall act in good faith if, at the moment of disclosure of the information 
referred to in Article 5 paragraph 1 herein, he believes that the disclosure is true, and if before 
such disclosure he has verified the accuracy and completeness of the data, within his capacities, 
and if, based on this information, another person with average knowledge and experience 
similar to the person making a disclosure would believe that the disclosure is true. 
It shall be deemed that a person acted in bad faith if: 
1. he requested or received any benefit for himself or another person, or requested 
infliction of  damage to another person, in order not to disclose information referred to in 
Article 5, paragraph 1 herein. 
2. while disclosing the information referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1 herein, besides 
the request to act upon the disclosure, he also requested an illegal benefit for himself or another 
person.   
Article 7 
Protection of Associated Persons 
An associated person shall have the same protection as a whistleblower, if he makes 
probable that damaging action has been undertaken against him due to connection to a 
whistleblower. 
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Article 8 
Protection for Disclosing the Information while Executing Official Duties  
A person who, while executing official duties, made a disclosure referred to in Article 5, 
paragraph 1 herein, shall have the same protection as a whistleblower, if he makes probable 
that damaging action has been undertaken against him due to such disclosure.  
Article 9 
Right to Protection for Requesting an Information 
A person who requests from his employer information referred to in Article 5, 
paragraph 1 herein, shall have the same right to protection as a whistleblower, if he makes 
probable that damaging action has been undertaken against him due to request for information.  
Article 10 
Protection of a Whistleblower’s Personal Data 
A person authorized to receive disclosures shall, upon request by a whistleblower, 
protect the whistleblower’s personal data. 
Every person who learns about the data referred to in paragraph 1 herein, shall protect 
those data. 
A person authorized to receive disclosures shall, while receiving a disclosure referred to 
in Article 5, paragraph 1 herein, inform a whistleblower that his identity may be revealed to the 
competent authority, if the actions of that authority would not otherwise be possible, and 
inform him about protection measures of participants in criminal proceedings. 
If it is necessary to reveal the identity of a whistleblower in the course of proceedings, a 
person authorized to receive disclosures shall inform the whistleblower about it before 
revealing his identity. 
A whistleblower’s personal data shall not be revealed to a person to whom the 
disclosure referred to in Article 5, paragraph1 herein is related. 
Chapter III 
PROCEDURE 
Article 11 
Urgency in Undertaking Actions upon Disclosure 
Acting upon disclosures referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1 herein shall be particularly 
urgent. 
While acting in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, measures to protect 
personal data shall be applied.  
Article 12 
Types of Whistleblowing 
Whistleblowing may be internal, external, or to the public. 
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Internal whistleblowing is making a disclosure to an employer. 
External whistleblowing is making a disclosure to an authorized authority. 
Whistleblowing to the public is making a disclosure through the mass media, internet, at 
public gatherings, or in any other way a disclosure may be made public. 
Article 13 
Initiation of Whistleblowing  
Whistleblowing is initiated by disclosing information, to an employer, authorized 
authority or to the public in accordance with this Law. 
The disclosure referred to in paragraph 1 of this article must contain information about 
violation of legislation causing threats to the public interests, information about the employer, 
facts,  and circumstances causing a whistleblower to believe that a disclosure is true. 
The disclosure may contain the signature of and data on the whistleblower, as well as 
any other important facts and circumstances.  
An employer or an authorized authority shall act upon anonymous disclosures within 
their competences. 
Article 14 
Internal Whistleblowing 
A procedure of internal whistleblowing is initiated by making a disclosure to an 
employer. 
 Every employer employing more than ten employees shall regulate the internal 
whistleblowing procedure by a general act. 
 If a disclosure is made within an employer with ten or fewer employees, it shall be made to a 
responsible person within that employer. 
 Provisions of the general act on internal whistleblowing procedure must be in accordance 
with this Law and by-laws adopted in accordance with this Law. 
 Provisions of the general act referred to in Article 4 herein not in line with this Law and by-
law adopted in accordance with this Law are null and void.  
 A Government act shall closely regulate internal whistleblowing procedure for employers 
with more than 10 employees. 
Article 15 
Obligations of Employer 
An employer shall protect a whistleblower and any associated person from any 
damaging action. 
  The employer referred to in Article 14, paragraph 2 herein shall post the general act 
regulating internal whistleblowing procedure in a visible place. 
 The employer referred to in Article 14, paragraph 2 herein shall appoint a person authorized 
to receive disclosures and act upon them, and inform every person in a working relationship 
with him in writing about their right to protection in accordance with the Law.  
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 An employer shall act upon the disclosure by which a whistleblowing has been made within 
15 days from the day the disclosure was received. 
An employer shall inform a whistleblower about the outcome of the procedure within 
15 days from the day of completion of procedure.  
 An employer shall, upon a whistleblower’s request, provide to him information about the 
progress of and actions undertaken within the procedure, and enable him to have access to the 
case file and to participate in actions in the procedure. 
Article 16 
External Whistleblowing 
A procedure of external whistleblowing is initiated by disclosure of information to an 
authorized authority. 
Article 17 
Obligations of an Authorized Authority 
An authorized authority shall act upon a disclosure within 15 days from the day the 
disclosure was received. 
If an authorized authority to which the disclosure was made is not competent to act 
upon such whistleblowing, it shall forward the information to a competent authority within the 
time limit stipulated by the law from the day the disclosure was made, and inform the 
whistleblower of this action. 
If a whistleblower requested to keep his identity confidential, and an authorized 
authority  to which the disclosure was made to by the whistleblower is not competent to act, it 
shall, prior to forwarding the disclosure to an authorized authority, request approval by the 
whistleblower to do so. 
An authorized authority shall inform a whistleblower about the outcome of the 
procedure within 15 days from the day of completion of procedure.  
 An authorized authority shall, upon a whistleblower’s request, provide to him information 
about the progress of and actions undertaken within the procedure, and enable him to have 
access to the case file and to participate in actions in the procedure. 
Article 18 
Whistleblowing to the Public 
 A whistleblower may make a disclosure to the public if he has previously made a disclosure 
to an authorized authority and if: 
 1) the procedure before the authorized authority is not conducted within the 
reasonable time limit, 
2) he believes that the procedure finalized before an authorized authority was irregular. 
 Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this article, a whistleblower may make a disclosure to the 
public without previous disclosure made to an authorized authority in the case of immediate 
threat to life, health, safety of people, survival of plant and animal life and the environment, if 
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there is a stipulated obligation to disclose the information to the public which is not fulfilled or 
if the information relates to the authorized authority. 
An authorized authority cannot request any information about a whistleblower from a 
journalist or editor-in-chief, or any other information that might lead to revealing a 
whistleblower’s identity, if a whistleblower requested anonymity from a journalist, except in the 
cases stipulated by the law regulating journalists’ secrets. 
While making a disclosure to the public, a whistleblower shall comply with the 
presumption of innocence in the court proceedings, right to privacy, right to personal data 
protection, and shall not jeopardize the conduct of court proceedings.  
Article 19 
Whistleblowing when a Disclosure Contains Classified Data 
If a disclosure contains classified data, a whistleblower shall have the right to protection 
from damaging actions if he acted in good faith and if he complied with the whistleblowing 
procedure envisaged by this Law and the general act of the employer.  
Classified data referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are those data classified in 
accordance with the regulations on classified data, and which refer to the national security of 
the Republic of Serbia, public safety, or defense, foreign affairs, security and intelligence affairs 
of state authorities, as well as relations of the Republic of Serbia with the other countries, 
international organizations, and other international entities.  
If a disclosure contains classified information, a whistleblower cannot make it public. 
If a disclosure contains classified information, a whistleblower shall comply with 
general and special measures for protection of classified data. 
Article 20 
Internal Whistleblowing if a Disclosure Contains Classified Data 
If a disclosure contains classified data, a whistleblower shall first address his employer, 
and if a disclosure refers to a person authorized to act upon disclosures, such disclosure shall be 
made to the immediate supervisor of that person.  
Article 21 
External Whistleblowing if a Disclosure Contains Classified Data 
 In case an employer failed to act upon a disclosure by a whistleblower which contained 
classified data, did not reply within a reasonable time, or did not undertake any adequate 
measures within his competence, a whistleblower can address an authorized authority. 
 Notwithstanding the paragraph 1 of this article, in case a disclosure refers to a manager 
within the employer, such disclosure shall be made to an authorized authority.   
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Chapter IV 
PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS AND COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 
Article 22 
Protection due to Whistleblowing 
The employer of a whistleblower shall not put a whistleblower or an associated person 
in an unfavorable position or cause him any damaging consequence due to whistleblowing, in 
particularly in relation to: 
1. employment procedure; 
2. getting the status of an intern or a volunteer; 
3. work outside employment; 
4. education, training, or professional development; 
5. promotion at work; 
6. disciplinary measures and penalties; 
7. working conditions;  
8. termination of employment.  
Provisions of a general act inflicting damaging consequences on a whistleblower or an 
associated person due to whistleblowing shall be null and void. 
Article 23 
Compensation for Damage due to Whistleblowing  
In cases of inflicting damaging consequences due to whistleblowing, a whistleblower 
and an associated person shall have the right to compensation for damage in accordance with 
the law regulating contract and torts. 
Article 24 
Court Protection due to Whistleblowing 
A whistleblower or an associated person who is likely to suffer damaging consequences 
due to whistleblowing has the right to court protection.   
Court protection is exercised by lodging a lawsuit before a competent court within 90 
days from the day of learning about the damaging action undertaken, or 3 years from the day of 
the occurrence of a damaging consequence.  
In the court protection proceedings, the competent court is the higher court in the 
territory where the damaging action was undertaken or the court in the place where a 
damaging consequence occurred due to whistleblowing or in accordance with the place of 
adobe of a plaintiff.  
The court protection proceedings shall be urgent. 
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A revision13 shall always be permitted in court protection proceedings initiated due to 
whistleblowing.  
The provisions of the Civil Procedure Law applied in labor disputes shall be applied 
accordingly in the court protection proceedings. 
Article 25 
Content of a Lawsuit  
The following can be requested through a lawsuit for protection due to whistleblowing: 
1) to establish that a whistleblower or an associated person suffers damaging 
consequences, or that a damaging action has been undertaken against him; 
2) to prohibit engagement in or repetition of a damaging action; 
3) to eliminate damaging consequences; 
4) to compensate for material and non-material damages; 
5) to publish the judgment rendered upon a lawsuit filed due to reasons referred to in 
items 1) to 4) above in the mass media, at the expense of the accused. 
A lawsuit for protection due to whistleblowing cannot revoke the legality of an 
employer’s individual act used to resolve rights, obligations and responsibilities of an employee 
from the employment, given that an employee has the right to court protection in accordance 
with other law.  
Article 26 
Representation by Other Authorities 
With a written power of attorney, the Commissioner for Information of Public 
Importance and Personal Data Protection (hereinafter referred to as: the Commissioner), 
Ombudsperson, Provincial Ombudsperson, Local Self-Government Unit Ombudsperson, or the 
Anti-Corruption Agency may also be a proxy in the court proceedings for protection of 
whistleblowers and associated persons. 
Article 27 
 Introducing the Parties to the Right to Resolve a Dispute through 
Mediation  
The court conducting proceedings for protection due to whistleblowing shall, in the 
preliminary hearing, or the first hearing for the main hearing, instruct the parties of the option 
of pre-trial settlement through mediation or in any other amicable manner. 
Article 28 
Burden of Proof in the Court Proceedings 
In case the plaintiff has shown a likelihood during the proceedings that he had suffered 
damaging consequence due to whistleblowing, the burden of proof shall be on his employer and 
                                                           
13
 [Translation note: a ‘revision’ is an extraordinary legal remedy by which the Court of Cassation can 
revoke a lower court decision. It functions in some ways like an appeal of an appellate decision.] 
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the employer shall have to prove that the damaging consequence is not in causal relation with 
whistleblowing or that the whistleblower failed to act in good faith. 
Article 29 
Investigative Principle 
In a court protection proceeding regarding whistleblowing, the court may establish the 
facts even when not in dispute among the parties, and may also independently investigate facts 
not presented by either party in the proceedings, if the court deems it important to the outcome 
of the proceedings. 
Article 30 
Absence of an Accused 
In case a duly summoned defendant fails to appear at the main hearing, the court may 
conduct the hearing without the defendant, as well as decide on the basis of the facts established 
at that hearing. 
Article 31 
Temporary Protection 
If a whistleblower or an associated person makes probable that a damaging action has 
been undertaken against him, or that he suffers damaging consequences due to whistleblowing, 
he shall have the right to temporary protection before the court.  
 A temporary protection consists of an order for temporary relief. 
A competent court before which the proceedings for court protection due to 
whistleblowing are conducted shall be competent to order temporary relief. 
Article 32 
Request for Temporary Relief 
Request for temporary relief may be filed before initiation of the court proceedings for 
protection due to whistleblowing, in the course of the proceedings, or until the moment the 
enforcement has been realized.  
A court may be requested, through a request for temporary relief, to stay the legal effect 
of an act or to prohibit damaging action causing damaging consequence.   
Notwithstanding Article 31, paragraph 3 herein, if a request for temporary relief is filed 
before the court conducting the proceedings upon the lodged appeal against the decision 
concerning the subject of lawsuit, or in the proceedings concerning an extraordinary legal 
remedy, the court that decides on the legal remedy shall decide on the proposed temporary 
relief and shall with no delay inform the first-instance court. 
If temporary relief is ordered prior to the lodging of a lawsuit, the court shall determine 
the time limit to lodge a lawsuit for whistleblower protection, taking into account the time limits 
stipulated by different regulations within which a lawsuit may be lodged. 
The court shall decide upon the request for temporary relief within eight days from the 
day the request was filed. 
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Article 33 
Ex Officio Determination of Temporary Relief 
In the course of the proceedings, the court may, ex officio, establish temporary relief in 
accordance with the law regulating enforcement and security in order to prevent any violent 
action or to avoid irreparable damage. 
Article 34 
Appeal against Resolution on Temporary Relief 
An separate appeal14 shall not be permitted against the order for temporary relief. 
Article 35 
Assistance in Relation to Whistleblowing 
The Commissioner, Ombudsperson, Provincial Ombudsperson, and the Anti-Corruption 
Agency shall provide assistance and information to any person interested in whistleblowing, 
protection of whistleblowers and associate persons due to whistleblowing, as well as any other 
rights in relation to whistleblowing. 
Chapter V 
PENAL PROVISIONS 
Article 36 
Misdemeanors  
A fine ranging from RSD 50,000 to RSD 500,000 shall be imposed on an employer - legal 
entity:  
1. If it fails to adopt a general act on internal whistleblowing procedure (Article 14, 
paragraph 2); 
2. If it fails to post the act regulating internal whistleblowing procedure in a visible place 
(Article 15, paragraph 2); 
3. If it fails to appoint person authorized to receive and act upon disclosures, or, if it fails to 
inform all employees about the right to protection of whistleblowers in writing (Article 
15, paragraph 3); 
4. If it fails to act upon a whistleblowing disclosure within the stipulated time limits, 
(Article 15, paragraph 4); 
5. If it fails to inform a whistleblower about the outcome of a procedure within the 
stipulated time limit (Article 15, paragraph 5); 
6. If it fails to provide information to a whistleblower about the progress and actions 
undertaken in the procedure, or fails to enable a whistleblower to have access to the 
case file and to participate in the actions in the procedure (Article 15, paragraph 6).  
 
                                                           
14
 Translation note: In case that there are grounds for an appeal, a separate appeal on the order for 
temporary relief is not permitted. Nevertheless, these grounds may be brought within the appeal against 
the final court decision.   
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A fine ranging from RSD 10,000 to RSD 100,000 shall be imposed on a representative in a 
legal entity, state authority, authority of the autonomous province, or local self-government unit 
for the misdemeanor referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. 
A fine ranging from RSD 20,000 to RSD 200,000 shall be imposed on an entrepreneur for the 
misdemeanor referred to in paragraph 1 herein. 
A fine ranging from RSD 30,000 to RSD 150,000 shall be imposed on a responsible person 
referred to in paragraph 2 herein who undertakes the action with the aim of revealing a 
whistleblower’s identity  
Chapter VI 
TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS  
Article 37 
Time limit for By-Law Adoption 
 The act referred to in Article 14 Paragraph 6 this Law shall be passed within six months from 
the effective date of this article. 
 Employers shall adopt the general act referred to in Article 14, paragraph 4 herein, or shall 
harmonize an existing general act with provisions contained herein and the act by the 
Government referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within nine months from the day this Law 
comes into effect. 
Article 38 
Cessation of Validity of other Regulations 
On the day this Law takes effect, Article 56 of the Anti-Corruption Act (“Official Gazette 
of the RS”, nos. 97/08, 53/10, 66/11 – Constitutional Court, 67/13 – Constitutional Court and 
112/13 – authentic interpretation) and the Rulebook on Protection of a Person who Reports 
Suspicion on Corruption (“Official Gazette of the RS”, no. 56/11) shall cease to be valid. 
Persons with the right to protection and compensation under the provisions of law 
referred to in paragraph 1 this article at the time the rights were exercised shall apply the legal 
provisions in force at the time the right were exercised. 
Article 39 
Coming into Effect 
This Law shall come into effect on the eight day from the day of its publication in the 
“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, and shall start to be applied three months from the 
day of its coming into effect.  
 
 
 
